Angola’s Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Efforts
Risks and General Situation
Introduction
Angola is exposed to money laundering (ML) threats from proceeds of crime emanating from within and outside the country through its financial system, real estate sector, and cross-border trade. The country’s geographical position and economic development make it a transit route for illegal drugs.
Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF)
The UIF is the national financial intelligence unit (FIU) of Angola responsible for:
- Receipt, request, analysis, and evaluation of reports
- Dissemination of financial intelligence and other relevant information to law enforcement agencies
- Autonomy and operational independence
- Reasonable capacity to perform core functions
- Access to a wide range of databases
Terrorist and Proliferation Financing (TF)
Introduction
Some Angolan authorities have demonstrated a good understanding of TF risks facing the country, but there is no indication that Angola has implemented measures to address high-risk scenarios identified in the NRA report. Lack of coordination and collaboration between relevant authorities is an area for improvement.
Financial Information Unit (UIF)
- Responsible for receiving, requesting, analyzing, and evaluating reports
- Disseminating financial intelligence and other relevant information to law enforcement agencies
- Has autonomy and operational independence
- Reasonable capacity to perform core functions
- Access to a wide range of databases
Areas for Improvement
- Enhanced measures to address high-risk scenarios
- Equipping competent authorities with adequate capacities to identify ML and TF cases and risks associated with both crimes
- Relevant AML/CFT policies informed by the identified risks
- Measures for the detection and seizure of non/falsely declared Bank Notes and Coins (BNIs)
- Implementation of alternative measures in situations where a conviction cannot be achieved
- Adequate implementation of measures for the restitution of assets that are traced and seized in other jurisdictions
- Improved coordination and collaboration between relevant authorities to combat TF
UIF Challenges
- Limited number of cross-border currency reports received
- No comprehensive strategic reports focused on analysis of typologies and trends relating to predicate crimes, ML, and TF
- Low use of conviction-based confiscation mechanism
- No implementation of non-conviction based confiscation
Conclusion
Angola has demonstrated a policy objective to curb ML through confiscation procedures, but this has manifested in relation to the recovery of proceeds of corruption-related offenses only. Further efforts are needed to pursue proceeds of other high-proceed-generating offenses and to implement measures for the detection and seizure of non/falsely declared BNIs.