Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (CTF) Measures in Brunei Darussalam

Executive Summary

Brunei has made significant progress in implementing AML/CTF measures, but there are still some gaps that need to be addressed.

• Operational Cooperation: The country has a high level of operational cooperation between financial investigation units, law enforcement agencies, and the Attorney General’s Chamber.
• Confiscation Procedures: There is a need for improvement in confiscation procedures and asset management.

Money Laundering (Chapter 3 - IO.8)

Brunei’s ML investigations and prosecutions have primarily focused on self-laundering activities with limited examples of stand-alone ML.

• Investigations and Prosecutions: The majority of ML investigations and prosecutions are for small, reasonably straightforward cases with limited complex ML methods.
• Operational Cooperation: There is a high level of operational cooperation between the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), law enforcement agencies, and the Attorney General’s Chamber.

Terrorist Financing (Chapter 4 - IO.9-11; R.1-R.8, R.30, R.31 & R.39)

Brunei authorities place a high priority on combating terrorism and TF and allocate significant well-coordinated resources to identify and mitigate TF threats.

• TF Investigations: There are no TF investigations, prosecutions, or convictions in Brunei to date.
• Institutional Structures: Brunei’s institutional structures and procedures are generally adequate for an appropriate response should a TF case be identified.

Preventive Measures (Chapter 5 - IO.4; R.9-R.23)

Some of the core elements of preventive measures are in place for Financial Institutions (FIs) and Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs), but there are some remaining gaps.

• Understanding of ML/TF Risks: Understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations varies across FIs and DNFBPs, with greater understanding amongst banks and larger FIs.