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Study Reveals Decline in Compliance with Better Regulation Standards in Brazil

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A recent study has uncovered a concerning trend: presidential decrees issued between 2009 and 2018 have failed to comply with better regulation standards, leading to a mismatch between values and practices. The analysis, which combines quantitative data from 128 decrees with interviews from top-ranked public managers and lawyers, suggests that this institutional trajectory is likely to continue.

Findings

The study’s findings indicate that the number of expulsive sanctions against Brazilian bureaucrats has increased rapidly over the years, with 68.5% of penalties enforced related to acts of corruption. However, despite this increase, a robust set of disciplinary norms and an anti-corruption agency have not led to a fully operational horizontal accountability system within the executive.

The analysis also reveals significant variations in corruption control across agencies, with disproportionate enforcement of sanctions and penalties. The study suggests that civil servants are reluctant to take on the role of corruption fighters due to self-protective behavior, leading to “convenient accountability” – a situation where institutions abdicate their responsibility for peer monitoring.

This phenomenon poses risks to internal disciplinary systems and increases dependence on external actors for accountability, ultimately compromising efficiency.

Implications

The study’s findings have important implications for public administration in Brazil, highlighting the need for better regulation practices and more effective anti-corruption measures. The consequences of not addressing these issues can lead to:

• Inefficient internal disciplinary systems
• Dependence on external actors for accountability
• Compromised efficiency

Key Takeaways

• Presidential decrees issued between 2009 and 2018 failed to comply with better regulation standards.
• Corruption control varies significantly across agencies, with disproportionate enforcement of sanctions and penalties.
• Civil servants are reluctant to take on the role of corruption fighters due to self-protective behavior.
• “Convenient accountability” – a situation where institutions abdicate their responsibility for peer monitoring – poses risks to internal disciplinary systems and increases dependence on external actors.

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