The Corrupt Collapse of Afghanistan’s Security Forces

The sudden collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in the wake of Kabul’s fall has raised questions about how corruption contributed to the Taliban’s triumph. The answer lies in a famous quote from Ernest Hemingway’s novel “The Sun Also Rises”: “Two ways: gradually, then suddenly.”

Gradual Undermining

Like bankruptcy, corruption in the ANDSF gradually undermined their willingness and ability to fight before the dramatic final downfall. The seeds of decay began soon after the 2001 US-led occupation.

• Initially, a decision was made to focus on a counterterrorism mission, which was understandable given the need to defeat al-Qaeda and prevent future attacks.
• To bolster their own forces, the United States and its allies turned to warlords whose corrupt regime had enabled the Taliban’s rise to power in the 1990s.

Failure to Build Sustainable Forces

However, instead of prioritizing the building of professional and sustainable Afghan military and police forces, the US and its allies failed to provide necessary resources and allowed corruption to flourish. Warlord-led networks used violence, patronage, and bribery to morph the ANDSF into an arena for their own armed groups.

The Leadership Crisis

As a result, the leadership of the ANDSF was dominated by warlords who were more interested in cutting deals with the Taliban than fighting or fleeing. When the time came to resist the Taliban’s advance, many soldiers and police forces found themselves isolated and without hope of receiving ammunition, food, fuel, or other resources required to keep fighting.

Lessons Learned

There are four key lessons for the US going forward:

• Lesson 1: Fresh Evaluation Needed - Western security assistance programs need a fresh evaluation, as many regimes receiving aid have corrupt and predatory security forces.
• Lesson 2: Governance Matters - Building counterterrorism forces first and governance later should be consigned to history; strong, accountable security institutions must be part of the main effort.
• Lesson 3: Arms Export Program Reform - US legislative and regulatory requirements for arms export programs must be reevaluated, as many countries receiving aid have been unable to offer competent showings against threats.
• Lesson 4: Overcome Polarization - Congress must overcome polarization to assess and undertake reforms necessary for the US to bounce back from this military defeat and meet tomorrow’s security challenges head-on.

Conclusion

The collapse of the ANDSF is a stark reminder that corruption can be a potent threat to national security. It is essential that the US takes steps to prevent its own security assistance programs from contributing to similar failures in the future.