Financial Crime World

Gambia Struggles to Address Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risks

Banjul, Gambia - The Gambian government has acknowledged the country’s vulnerabilities to money laundering (ML) and terrorism financing (TF), but its understanding of the scale of these threats remains limited.

Understanding the Threats


According to a report by [insert organization], fraud, drug trafficking, theft, bribery, and corruption are considered the main domestic ML threats in The Gambia. However, authorities lack a comprehensive assessment of organized crime, illicit trafficking in stolen goods, and arms trafficking, which increases their vulnerability to ML/TF.

Understanding of Terrorism Financing Threats


The country’s understanding of TF threats is also evolving, but more developed among certain agencies such as the State Intelligence Service (SIS), Police, Drugs Law Enforcement Agency (DLEAG), and Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has been identified as having the least understanding of TF risks.

National Counter-Terrorism Strategy


The report highlights that The Gambia is yet to adopt a National Counter-Terrorism Strategy that incorporates CFT, which hinders its ability to effectively address TF threats. However, the government has drafted a National Counterterrorism Strategy (Strategy Against Terrorism - GAMSAT).

Risk Assessments and Mitigation Measures


The risk assessments have identified higher-risk areas such as:

  • Banking
  • Foreign exchange
  • Remittance
  • Real estate
  • Casinos
  • Digital payment methods sectors

The Gambian authorities have taken some measures to mitigate these risks, including supervision of the real estate sector.

Informal Sector Concerns


Despite efforts, the country’s informal sector remains a significant concern, with many transactions conducted in cash, increasing the risk of ML/TF.

Recommendations and Next Steps


The report concludes that while there is some cooperation and coordination among authorities on AML/CFT policy and operational matters, it needs improvement to enhance effectiveness. The country’s lack of strategic guidance on PF matters is also a concern.

Recommendations include:

  • Improving risk assessments, cooperation, and coordination among agencies
  • Increasing transparency and regulation of DNFBPs (Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions)
  • Prioritizing implementing measures to address ML/TF risks in high-risk sectors, including banking, real estate, and foreign exchange
  • Strengthening capacity to address ML/TF threats

Private sector institutions have also been identified as needing to improve their understanding and implementation of AML/CFT regulations. The report recommends that the government should prioritize implementing measures to address ML/TF risks in high-risk sectors.

Conclusion


The Gambian authorities must work towards strengthening their capacity to address ML/TF threats, including improving their risk assessments, cooperation, and coordination among agencies, as well as increasing transparency and regulation of DNFBPs.