Financial Crime World

Guinea’s Mutual Evaluation Report Under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

Overview

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a mutual evaluation report on Guinea’s Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. The report highlights several weaknesses and gaps in Guinea’s AML/CFT regime, emphasizing the need for strengthening its domestic response to Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing/Proliferation Financing (ML/TF/PF).

Key Findings

Lack of Coordination

  • There is no national strategy emanating from the National Risk Assessment (NRA), leading to a lack of articulation and coordination in the domestic response to ML/TF/PF.
  • The NRA should be used as a tool to develop a comprehensive national strategy for AML/CFT.

Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) Limitations

  • The FIU relies heavily on judicial authorities for financial intelligence, but few Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) use financial intelligence when investigating predicate offenses.
  • There is a need to improve the capacity of the FIU and LEAs in using financial intelligence.

Defective System of Detecting False Declarations

  • The mechanism for detecting and communicating false declarations or non-declaration of cash and bearer negotiable instruments is defective and almost dysfunctional.
  • A new system should be established to detect and communicate false declarations effectively.
  • Guinea has investigative services and courts capable of identifying ML cases, but ML-related investigations and prosecutions are rare due to lack of prioritization, inadequate resources, and appropriate training.
  • There is a need to prioritize ML-related investigations and provide adequate resources and training for LEAs.

Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime

  • Confiscation of the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime is yet to become a criminal policy priority in Guinea.
  • A new law should be enacted to provide for confiscation of proceeds of crime.

Prevention of Terrorism Financing

  • The prevention of terrorism and its financing is not the subject of any national policy and strategy, which has led to a lack of coordination in sectoral responses.
  • A new policy and strategy should be developed to prevent terrorism financing.

Limited Use of Financial Intelligence

  • Financial Institutions (FIs) are the virtual exclusive contributors to Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs), but their potential to detect suspicious ML/TF activities is limited due to a significant portion of the population having no account with any financial institution or mobile money provider.
  • A new system should be established to encourage non-FI reporting.
  • Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) are the weak link in the AML/CFT chain in Guinea, with their contribution to reporting activity and due diligence measures being insignificant.
  • A new law should be enacted to require DNFBPs to report suspicious transactions.

Bank Supervision is Well Structured

  • However, risk-based supervision in other sub-sectors, such as insurance, foreign exchange bureaus, Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), and Electronic Money Institutions (EMIs), is virtually non-existent.
  • A new system should be established for risk-based supervision of these sub-sectors.
  • The transparency of legal persons and arrangements is constrained by structural challenges and poor understanding of ML/TF risks linked to these entities.
  • A new law should be enacted to provide for transparency of legal persons and arrangements.

Use of International Cooperation in AML/CFT

  • Guinea has no mechanism or adequate resources for using international cooperation in AML/CFT.
  • A new system should be established to enable the use of international cooperation in AML/CFT.