Uncovering the Jihadi Networks That Emerged After Tunisia’s 2011 Revolution

A Network of Terrorists Emerges in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia

In the aftermath of Libya’s 2011 revolution, a network of jihadis began to emerge in Tunisia, exploiting traditional smuggling routes and refugee camps to smuggle weapons into the country. A recent sanctions list revealed by the Tunisian government has shed light on this network, which was involved in several attacks and plots between 2011 and 2013.

The Emergence of a Terrorist Network

According to the sanctions list, many of the listed individuals became active only after the 2011 revolution. Out of 103 listings:

• 86 specified a group affiliation
• 17 had moved from one group to another
• The majority joined groups such as Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia (AST) or the Islamic State in Libya, Syria, or Tunisia

Weapons Smuggling and Financing Terrorism

One notable network consisted of 12 individuals who trafficked weapons into Tunisia following the revolution. Between May 2011 and August 2013:

• There were 10 weapons smuggling-related attempts that the Tunisian government was able to interdict
• Many more likely went unnoticed

Five individuals were also involved in financing terrorism-related crimes, including:

• Two who helped finance KUBN activities in the mountains
• One who financed the failed Islamic State takeover of Ben Gardane

The Importance of Counter-Terrorism Financing Regimes

Experts emphasize that the emergence of these networks highlights the importance of having a robust domestic counter-terrorism financing regime in place. As [expert name] noted, “By publicly identifying terrorists and their financiers, countries can deter others from supporting jihadis at home and abroad. Sanctions also block assets and access to the global financial system necessary to move resources in support of such activities.”

The Tunisian Government’s Response

The Tunisian government has designated AST as a terrorist organization since August 2013, which has pushed recruitment and radicalization efforts underground. However, the sanctions list reveals that many individuals continued to be involved in terrorist activity, often moving between different groups.

Conclusion

The emergence of jihad networks in Tunisia following the 2011 revolution highlights the importance of international cooperation and robust domestic counter-terrorism financing regimes in preventing terrorism. It is essential for countries to work together to disrupt the financial flows that support these networks and to ensure that those involved are held accountable.