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Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Liechtenstein Financial Centre
The provided report presents a comprehensive analysis of the risks associated with money laundering and terrorist financing in the Liechtenstein financial centre. The report highlights various sectors that pose a high risk for money laundering and terrorist financing.
High-Risk Sectors
- Banks and other financial institutions: These sectors are considered high-risk due to their complex products and services.
- Life insurance: Life insurance is also classified as a high-risk sector due to its potential for misuse.
- Securities/asset managers/funds: The report notes that these sectors have a high degree of complexity and are mainly used by high-net-worth individuals, which reduces their risk for terrorist financing.
- Casinos: Casinos are considered high-risk sectors due to their potential for money laundering.
Complex Products
The main products of the Liechtenstein financial centre, such as asset structuring, high-end asset management, insurance, and highly specialized investment funds, have a high degree of complexity and are mainly used by high-net-worth individuals. This reduces their risk for terrorist financing.
Low Risk of Terrorist Financing
- Products classified internationally as associated with high TF risks: These products are of very little significance in Liechtenstein.
- Suspicious activity reports: The report notes that there have been virtually no suspicious activity reports relating to terrorist financing.
- Comprehensive analyses of European FIUs on foreign terrorist fighters: Comprehensive analyses of European FIUs on foreign terrorist fighters have not made any reference to Liechtenstein.
Areas for Improvement
The report highlights some areas where the data situation is limited:
- Payment flows: The report lacks detailed information on payment flows from and to Liechtenstein, including banking transactions and payment service providers.
- Beneficial owners: There is a lack of information on the nationality and place of establishment of beneficial owners, particularly for banking and TCSP customers.
- PEPs: The number of maintained PEP relationships, including nationality and place of residence, is not available.
Recommendations
To address these limitations, the report suggests that a second round of the National Risk Assessment should be conducted to gather more comprehensive data on these areas.