West Africa’s Financial Underbelly: Uncovering Ways Terrorists Fund Their Activities in Niger

Introduction

In an effort to combat financial terrorism, the Inter Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) have collaborated on a research project to identify the methods used by terrorists, terrorist groups, and their supporters in the region to collect, transfer, and utilize funds. This report reveals shocking findings that have serious implications for national security.

Methodology

Experts from five West African countries - Burkino Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal - provided crucial data that helped researchers generate case studies, key indicators, and red flags. The study identified four main categories of typologies used by terrorist groups to finance their activities:

• Terrorist financing through trade and other lucrative activities, NGOs, charity organizations, and levies
• Smuggling of arms, assets, and currencies by cash couriers
• Drug trafficking

Findings

The report highlights the alarming reality that terrorists use both legitimate and illegitimate means to raise funds and move cash around. It also exposes the weakness in reporting institutions’ ability to identify suspicious transactions relating to terrorism financing.

Furthermore, the report reveals that:

• Security and surveillance at national borders are porous, allowing terrorists and small arms to infiltrate the region.
• Law enforcement and regulatory agencies, security and intelligence services, and the judiciary lack capacity to effectively address terrorism financing.
• National competent authorities’ inability and unwillingness to cooperate and share information has contributed to the deteriorating security situation in West Africa.

Recommendations

In light of these findings, the report provides recommendations for West African countries and regional/international authorities to improve their anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) efforts.

• Improve reporting institutions’ ability to identify suspicious transactions relating to terrorism financing
• Enhance security and surveillance at national borders
• Strengthen law enforcement and regulatory agencies, security and intelligence services, and the judiciary’s capacity to effectively address terrorism financing
• Encourage national competent authorities to cooperate and share information

Conclusion

As Niger struggles to contain the menace of terrorism, it is imperative that these findings are taken seriously and concrete steps are taken to address the vulnerabilities identified. The international community must also lend its support to help West African countries strengthen their AML/CFT frameworks and effectively combat financial terrorism.